








SURVEY ON THE OPTIMAL CONTROL
OF LANCHESTER-TYPE ATTRITION PROCESSES
James G. Taylor
March 1974
Partial Report for Period
September 1973 - December 1973
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
jared for:








The writing of this survey was supported by Naval Analysis Programs,
Office of Naval Research under ONR Project Order PO-4-0174 and Task
Number NR 276-039.
Reproduction of all or part of this report is not authorized without
permission of the Naval Postgraduate School.
This report was prepared by:
UNCLASSTFTF.D
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
I. REPORT NUMBER
NPS-55Tw74031
2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
SURVEY ON THE OPTIMAL CONTROL OF
LANCHESTER-TYPE ATTRITION PROCESSES
5. TYPE OF REPOPT 4 PERIOD COVERED
Partial Report for
September - December 1973
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORS 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERfeJ
James G. Taylor
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940 Code 55Tw
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA a WORK UNIT NUMBERS
II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS






13 NUMBER OF PAGES




16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of thla Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abatract entered In Block 20, If different from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverae aide It neceaaary and Identity by block number)
Military Tactics Optimal Distribution of Fire
Lanchester Theory of Combat Combat Dynamics
Tactical Allocation Differential Games
Optimal Control of Lanchester-Type Processes Optimal Control Theory
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverae aide It neceaaary and Identify by block number)
This is a survey paper on the author's research on applications of the
mathematical theory of optimal control/differential games to problems of mil-
itary conflict in order to study the structure of optimal tactical allocation
policies. This program has been carried out for tactical allocation problems
with the combat described by Lanchester-type equations of warfare. Both de-
terministic and stochastic attrition processes have been considered, although
the major emphasis has been on the former. Optimal allocation policies have
| been developed for numerous one-sided onfimi/arinn prnhlpms nf rari-ir.il
DD FORM"W 1 JAN 73
(Page 1)
1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014- 6601 |
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
UNCLASSIFIED
VbUJUITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfWim Data Enffd)
interest with deterministic Lanchester-type attrition processes in order to
study the dependence of the structure of these optimal policies upon model
form. Problem areas in applying current mathematical theories to solve such
problems are discussed. An important gap in the existing theory of differ-
ential games is identified. Various attrition models are considered (reflect-
ing different assumptions as to target acquisition process, command and con-
trol capabilities, target engagement process, variations in range capabilities
of weapon systems).
DD Form 1473 (BACK)
S/N ^102-014-6601 TINHLASSTFTFHSECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGECWhan Dafa Enffd)
PREFACE
This report surveys previous research on combining dynamical
optimization and combat modelling theories in order to gain insights
into the optimization of combat dynamics. This material was presented
by the author at the Symposium on the State-of-the-Art of Mathematics
in Combat Models held at McLean, Virginia (General Research Corporation)
on 14-15 June 1973.
As in any survey, details have been suppressed for the sake of
perspective. Further details are to be found, however, in the author's
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1 . Introduction .
In this paper we will review the results of the author's studies
of some idealized models for the optimization of combat dynamics and their
possible implications for defense planners. Our research approach has
been to combine Lanchester-type formulations of combat attrition (both
deterministic and stochastic) and generalized control theory [15] (both
deterministic and stochastic optimal control, dynamic programming, differ-
ential games). In this review we will summarize our past results. Details
are to be found in [35] and in the open literature.
A quantitative theory of tactical allocation has been developed
through the examination of a sequence of simplified models. These combat
models are far too simple to be taken literally but should be interpreted
as indicating general principles to serve as hypotheses for subsequent
higher resolution studies via computer simulation or field experimentation.
The effects of various modelling assumptions upon the structure of the
optimal allocation policies have been systematically studied by contrasting
the solutions for various models (see [36]).
A major result of our research has been that optimal tactical
allocation policies are quite sensitive to the precise type of model
adopted, even as to whether the tactical scenario lasts for a specified
period of time or terminates only when a pre-determined system state has
been reached. Insights have been provided into such important questions
as :
This term was apparently first coined by Y. C. Ho in [14].
However, the complete solution of these dynamical optimization problems is
at the frontier of applications of generalized control theory to operations
research.
(1) How should fire be distributed over targets?
(2) How should targets be selected?
(3) Do target priorities change over time?
(4) Do force levels affect the optimal allocation policy?
(5) How does the number of target types affect the optimal allocation
policy?
(6) Do conflict termination circumstances affect the optimal alloca-
tion policy? •
(7) How is the optimal fire distribution/target selection policy
affected by the nature of the attrition process?
(8) What is the effect of logistics constraints on such policies?
(9) How does the uncertainty and confusion of combat affect optimal
allocation policies?
To develop our theory of tactical allocation we have extensively
studied some specific combat scenarios. Optimal tactics for the following
have been studied: selection of target type at which to fire, regulation
of firing rate. The influences of the following factors have all been
considered
:
(1) combatant objectives (form of criterion function and valuation
of surviving forces)
,
(2) weapon system performance characteristics,
(3) termination conditions of conflict,
(4) force strengths and composition,
(5) type of attrition process,
(6) effects of resource (logistics) constraints,
(7) range capabilities of weapon systems.
The tactical situations that have been studied are described by
deterministic Lanchester-type equations of warfare. The combat continues
over a period of time with a choice of tactics available to both sides
and subject to change over time. The mathematical theory of deterministic
optimal control/differential games has been used to solve the problems
under consideration.
In 1964 Dolansky [8] noted that the Lanchester theory of combat
was insufficiently developed in the area of target selection for combat
between heterogeneous forces (optimal control/differential games) . Even
the two references cited by him, Weiss [47] and Isbell and Marlow [18],
have been subsequently extended by the author [32], [38]. Since Dolansky's
article, the only work known to this author (except for that contained in
Isaacs' book [17]) has been by Chattopadhyay [4], [5], Etter [9], Intril-
ligator [16], Kawara [20], Moglewer and Payne [22], and Sternberg [30].
A further review of this work and a discussion of its relationship to
that of the author are to be found in [35].
2. Elements of the Combat Optimization Problem .
One may consider that there are three essential parts of any
dynamical combat optimization problem:
(1) the decision criteria (for both combatants)
,
(2) the model of conflict termination conditions (and/or unit
breakpoints)
,
(3) the model of combat dynamics.
In the opinion of this author our knowledge of the topics in the above
list increases as we go down the list. Relatively little is known about
such decision making criteria and even less has appeared in the literature.
*
Since this conference was held, the following noteworthy article has
appeared in the open literature [26].
Some work on models of conflict termination has appeared [12], [48], [49],
although its real impact has not yet apparently been felt. Although our
knowledge is still far from perfect in modelling combat dynamics, an
extensive literature does exist (see [41] or [11]).
In the course of our research we have become increasingly aware of
the importance of the first two elements above, and we feel that more
basic research is needed on them. Other items that could be added to the
above list are: (a) the information structure and (b) the actual decision
latitude of the combatants. It should be pointed out that in essentially
all (see Section 3.5 of [36] for an exception) the problems that we have
considered, it has been assumed that each decision maker has perfect
information about the state variables (e.g. force levels) and model parameters
3. Overview of Research Program .
In developing our quantitative theory of tactical allocation we
have considered the following subject areas:
(1) combat attrition models,
(2) deterministic versus stochastic models of combat attrition,
(3) special features of deterministic optimal control models for
tactical allocation.
Thus, in performing our research we have tried to bring together several
bodies of knowledge which previously existed as well-defined entities but
without any interaction. A detailed discussion of these topics and their
interactions is to be found in [35].
The reader will note that our research has concentrated primarily
on one-sided dynamical optimization problems. This has been done for two
reasons: (1) the well-known intimate connection between optimal control
theory and differential games (see Section 4 of [36]), and (2) the lack
of certain key results in the current theory of differential games (see
below). Accordingly, our research approach has been to study optimal
fire distribution problems for dynamic combat situations with decisions
available to both sides by first considering corresponding one-sided
(optimal control) problems. After the difficult points have been mastered
in the simpler one-sided problems, then the differential games are most
profitably tackled.
4 . Lanchester-Type Differential Games .
In a two-person zero-sum deterministic differential game with
closed-loop (or feedback) strategies [15] (henceforth simply referred to
as a differential game) each player chooses a strategy (for precise
definitions see [1] or [10]) in order to maximize his own criterion func-
tional (which when added to that of his opponent yields zero) for a system
whose dynamics are described by a system of ordinary differential equations.
Without being precise, it seems appropriate to refer to a differential
game as being a Lanchester-type differential game when the system dynamics
are described by Lanchester-type equations of warfare.
It should be pointed out that contemporary research on applications
of differential games has concentrated primarily on pursuit-evasion prob-
lems (see the survey papers by Berkovitz [2], Y. C. Ho [15], and Simakova
(USSR literature) [28]) or, more recently, economics problems. Theoretical
research has focused on questions of existence of (a) value of the differ-
ential game [6], [7], [10] and (b) a saddle point in pure strategies [10].
As we shall see, Lanchester-type differential games contain certain more
or less unique aspects (most important of which is the presence of state
variable inequality constraints ) that have not been addressed adequately
in this previous research.
An example of a fairly general Lanchester-type differential game
is as follows:
n m
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The above problem (1) contains all the essential features (and can be made
identical to by minor changes in formulation) of all the Lanchester-type
differential games studied previously in the operations research litera-
ture (see Section 1 above)
.
First and foremost to the mathematician is the question as to
whether a differential game such as (1) has value. The significance of
this question for the operations analyst is that its answer tells him
whether he has chosen an appropriate formulation for his problem. Consid-
ering results of Friedman (see Chapter 6 of [10]), it may be shown that
such two-sided fire distribution problems in the Lanchester theory of
combat do have value and a saddle point in pure strategies (see [33], [36],
[39]). An essential requirement which leads to this result is that the
Hamiltonian be separable, i.e. a function independent of
<J>
plus a func-
tion independent of i|). It should be pointed out that this need not be
true for other dynamical structures. For example, when defensive capa-
bilities were considered in the attrition process in a tactical air war
game extensively studied at RAND, the resulting model did not possess a
solution in pure strategies (see [36]).
Provided that certain technical requirements are met. Most remarkable is
the fact that the existence of value for such a differential game cannot
be guaranteed unless replacements are allowed .
**
We use the symbol <j> to denote all the strategic variables under the
control of X.
8It is the opinion of the author that the current-state-of-the-
art for solving differential games is not sufficient to allow routine
solution of a problem like (1) . This statement is made in full knowledge
of numerous papers (including some of the author's) that have appeared
in the literature. Problem areas in the mathematical theory of Lanchester-
type differential games then are as follows:
(1) no adequate theory of state variable inequality constraints
(SVIC's) currently exists*
(2) synthesis of extremals,
(3) determination of optimal strategies from extremal strategic-
variable pairs,
(4) presence of singular surfaces in the solution.
A detailed discussion of the above is to be found in [35]. For now, let
us just touch the high points.
One of our research findings [35] has been that a theory of state
**
variable inequality constraints (which is essential for solving problems
such as (1) because of the requirement that force levels be non-negative
(see also [43])) is lacking in the current theories for differential
games. In fact, the treatment in the literature of SVIC s in one-sided
Since the conference, the author has succeeded in developing necessary
conditions of optimality for differential games with SVIC's [46]. Applica-
tions of these results are also given in this report.
**
In (1) x-^ for i = 1, . . . ,m and y-j for j = 1, . . . ,n are state variables
while the <j> ' s and iJj's are called strategic variables. An example of a
SVIC is the condition that x^ ^ , i.e. the X± force level must be
non-negative.
A. Friedman (see Chapter 6 in [10]) and others have discussed the existence
of value for differential games with SVIC's. However, the analogues of the
well-known control theory multiplier conditions for constrained subarcs [19]
are not developed. In fact, the treatment of the example on pp. 239-240 of
[10] by Friedman is inadequate, since his approach fails to yield optimal
strategies for minor modifications in the problem's formulation [46].
optimal control problems has not been entirely satisfactory: in studying
the problems discussed in this paper, the author has made some contribu-
tions on SVIC's to the optimal control theory literature [34], [42].
The synthesis of extremals from the basic necessary conditions of
optimality can be complicated even in a one-sided version of (1) (see
[36]). The determination of optimal strategies from extremal strategic-
variable pairs can be quite complex even in the case of the simplest
terminal control differential game (called game of survival by Friedman
[10]) (see [39]). It is well-known (see [13], [17]) that singular surfaces
(in the sense of Isaacs (see pp. 132-134 of [17])) play a key role in
solving differential games. The author has frequently encountered (in
Isaacs ' terminology) universal surfaces and dispersal surfaces in Lan-
chester-type differential games of interest. We will consider one-sided
problems below with singular subarcs (i.e. their solution contains a
universal surface in Isaacs' terminology) and dispersal surfaces in their
solution.
Because of the above noted difficulties and the lack of theoretical
results for SVIC's, the author attempted to master such difficulties by
first considering simpler one-sided dynamic combat optimization problems.
It then turned out that the state-of-the-art of deterministic optimal
control theory was not sufficient to allow routine solution of even the
simplest Lanchester-type optimal control problem [33], [43].
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5. Special Features of Deterministic Optimal Control Models for Tactical
Allocation .
Before we consider examples of Lanchester-type optimal control
problems, we will discuss some special features of such problems which
make solving them (even today) a non-routine matter. These remarks are
based on the author's experiences in trying to solve numerous particular
problems. The special features of deterministic Lanchester-type optimal
control problems are then as follows:
(1) non-uniqueness of extremals,
(2) state variable inequality constraints,
(3) singular subarcs.
Again, we will summarize the main points here with a detailed discussion
to be found in [35].
The purpose of our research has been to determine optimal fire
distribution/ target selection policies for dynamic tactical allocation
problems. However, as the reader is undoubtedly aware, the maximum
principle (or the max-min principle for differential games) only provides
necessary conditions of optimality. It is customary to refer to a path
on which the necessary conditions of optimality (maximum principle) are
satisfied everywhere in time as an extremal . Thus, one must demonstrate
the optimality of an extremal trajectory. Two ways in which this may be
done are as follows
:
(a) check whether sufficient conditions of optimality are satisfied
on the extremal,
This means that the necessary conditions of optimality have been developed
for the class of piecewise continuous controls.
11
* **
(b) by citing the appropriate existence theorem, show that an
optimal control exists for the problem under consideration; there
are two further subcases: (1) if the extremal is unique, then it
is optimal or (2) if the extremal is not unique and only a finite
number exist, then the optimal trajectory is determined by consid-
ering a finite number of alternatives.
It has not been convenient to take the former approach (see [38], [43],
[45]). (It is noteworthy that for problems with "square-law" attrition
of target types (see [36], [37]) (like problem (2) below) the problem
may be cast in a form for which all the sufficient conditions of (global)
optimality are satisfied except the requirement that the planning horizon
kkk
be of fixed length. )
Thus, we have taken the second approach to demonstrating the
optimality of an extremal. If an extremal is unique, then it is optimal
and no difficulty exists. However, in the simplest possible fire distri-
bution problem we have shown that extremals are not unique for a certain
range of model parameters [33], [43]. In other words, local extrema exist
for these problems and each one must be examined. One may even have to
contend with a dispersal surface (see pp. 132-141 of [17]) being present
k&kk
in the solution. This rare singular surface is difficult to determine,
since its presence cannot be determined directly from the maximum principle
*
This is essentially a condensation of the general solution procedure given
in [24], [33], and [39] (see also Appendix G of [35]).
**
Unfortunately, existence theorems are usually proven (see [21]) for the
class of measurable control functions so that a gap exists between the classes
of functions for which the necessary conditions of optimality are developed
and those for which existence theorems are proven.
***
This is because such a battle is terminated anytime a side is annihilated.
k-kk-k
This occurs in both the supporting weapon system game of H. K. Weiss [39]
and the Isbell-Marlow fire distribution problem [33].
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but requires "considerations in the large." The existence of multiple
extremals in Lanchester-type optimal control problems has important impli-
cations for devising computational methods.
In all Lanchester-type dynamic tactical allocation problems the
force levels are required to be non-negative (or an equivalent condition)
.
In such models, force levels will be represented by state variables so
that such a restriction is mathematically called a state variable inequality
constraint (SVIC) . The maximum principle (in its original form [23]) is
**
inadequate to handle SVIC's, and separate necessary conditions of optimality
apply to subarcs which lie on the boundary of the state space. When we
began our research, we found that results were widely scattered in the
literature and that a completely adequate theory to solve even the simplest
fire distribution problem did not exist. Moreover, our subsequent research
on the "simplest" fire distribution problem has led to several contribu-
tions on SVIC's to the control theory literature [34], [42]. It finally
should be noted that lack of a theory of SVIC's is a gap in the current
theory of differential games.
As we have seen above, the strategic variables (e.g. fraction of
X. who fire at Y.) appear linearly in Lanchester-type differential
games (see equation (1) above) . In the control theory literature (Isaacs
[17] uses different terminology) such problems are called singular (because
the matrix of second partial derivatives of the Hamiltonian with respect
to the strategic variables is a singular matrix) and require special treat-
ment. One-sided versions of such fire distribution problems then are
*
Negative force levels do not make physical sense.
**
See [19] for an almost comprehensive review of results for optimal control
problems with SVIC's.
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singular problems of optimal control. For such problems the maximum
principle may not determine the singular control and the classical theory
does not provide adequate tests of optimality for singular subarcs (see
[38]).
A mathematical theory of singular (in the control theory sense)
subarcs is essential for solving tactical allocation problems within the
Lanchester theory of combat because it is required to identify optimal
fire distribution policies that are not extreme points of the control
variable space (i.e. policies that are other than or 1). The author
has shown that an optimal fire distribution policy, denoted as <\>* , such
that < <j>* < 1 arises in a simple problem of fire distribution for a
homogeneous force in Lanchester combat against two enemy force types
each of which undergoes attrition at a rate proportional to the product
of the number of firers and targets [38]. Finally, there may be other
types of singular surfaces (in the sense of Isaacs (see pp. 132-134 of [17]))
in the solution to Lanchester-type optimal control problems of interest.
6. The Isbell-Marlow Fire Programming Problem .
The Isbell-Marlow fire programming problem [18] is probably the
simplest optimal control problem that arises in the Lanchester theory
of combat. Consequently, the development of a complete solution to this
problem along with the appropriate solution methodology is vital for guiding
extensions to situations of more complex combat dynamics (both one-sided and
two-sided) . The author views this problem then as a "benchmark" case to
which the treatment (both theoretical and computational) of more compli-
cated problems can (and should) be related. Moreover, several useful
For example, one could test the capability of a computational approach like
Lagrange dynamic programming [25] on a discrete-time version of this problem,
14
insights into the structure of optimal fire distribution policies in
more general cases may be obtained from this simpler problem.
The simplest fire distribution problem is for combat between a
heterogeneous X force of two force types (for example, riflemen and
grenadiers) and a homogeneous Y force (for example, riflemen only).
This situation is shown diagramatically in Figure 1. Let us consider the
case in which it is the objective of the Y-force commander to maximize
the net worth of survivors (considering a linear utility for the number
of each force type) at the end of battle. This is accomplished through
his fraction of fire, denoted as
<f>
, directed at X . We will consider
a battle lasting until one side or the other is totally annihilated
and will discuss more general "breakpoints" below.
Figure 1. Diagram of Fire Programming Problem.
This is a special case of a terminal control battle in which the end of
battle is determined by the system being steered to a specified end point
15
Mathematically the problem may be stated as
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with the stopping rule
(a) y(T) = 0,
or (b) X]_(T) = x
2
(T) = 0, (3)
where









and b are constant attrition-rate coefficients,
and <j) is the fraction of the Y force who fire at X .
The optimal fire distribution policy for the above problem (2) , (3)
is given in [33] (with some further refinements given in [43]). Because
*
o
It is expressed as an open-loop control, i.e.
<f>*
= <j>*(t ;t ,x y ) , in
[33] and [43] (see [14]).
U i
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of the complexity of the complete solution, it will not be given here.
However, we will summarize the essential characteristics of the optimal
fire distribution policy , denoted as <{>* . These are as follows:
(1) <f>* is always or 1 (except for at most one point in time) ,
(2) parameters on which the optimal policy depends are
(a) whether Y wins or loses,













There are some important interpretations of the above: (A) a.b. is a
measure of strategic value of firing at X. (rate of destruction of X.'s
kill capability against Y) , and (B) a p is measure of short-run return
to Y from firing at X
1
at end of battle (rate of destruction of X..
value at end of battle)
.
The most significant aspect of the optimal fire distribution policy
for (2) and (3) is that it depends directly upon the force levels alone .
This result is remarkable because the maximum principle does not directly
involve the state variables (i.e. the force levels) when the Hamiltonian
is maximized for x
,
x > 0. This above statement revises remarks made
in [36]. Furthermore, the optimal policy for Y may be different depending
on whether he wins or loses. Assuming that R = a b /(a b ) > 1, then if
Y is going to win, <J>* = 1 for x > 0. If Y is going to lose, then
the solution depends on another parameter (6 = a p/(a q)) and is very
complicated to express as a closed-loop policy. However, it is instructive
to discuss the general features of Y's optimal fire distribution policy
*
In other words, we can express the optimal policy as a closed-loop control
<j>* = k(x ,x ,y), and the force level dependence is real.
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when Y loses. Let p = k(l+y)b and q = kb , where y is a
parameter which reflects whether the surviving X forces are valued
more (y>0) or less (y<0) than in direct proportion to their kill
capability. Then p = q(b_ /b„) (1+y) , and it is readily shown that
y = -1 + <S/R. Moreover, we have (1) y = means that surviving enemy
weapon systems are valued in direct proportion to their kill capability;
(2) for y ;> -(1-1/R) , simple solution: <j>* = 1 for x > 0; (3) for
i
*
-(1-1/R) > y ^ - /1-1/R, it is complicated to obtain solution; and (4)
for - /1-1/R > y ^ -1, it is very complicated to obtain solution. In
the latter two cases, <f>* is 1 and then changes to later. When
this change occures is the complicated part.
The above has an important implication: in battle a commander must
use his judgment to ascertain to what end the course of battle can be
steered so that he may devise his strategy accordingly. Computationally
-
it means that to solve such a problem one must know to which extremal end
states the system can be steered (i.e. what force levels are required
to drive the system to a target set such that appropriate necessary condi-
tions of optimality are satisfied at the end) . The author has discovered
that the above characteristic is present in all Lanchester-type optimiza-
tion problems. In other words, it turns out that considerations "in the
large" dominate obtaining the optimal policy over time in such a dynamic
optimization problem.
Let us illustrate one of the computational difficulties (multiple
extremals) in obtaining the optimal policy discussed above. In Table I
It should be noted that for R > 1 we have < 1 - 1/R < 1.
**
The author has developed theoretical results along this line.
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is shown the results of applying the maximum principle in the first phase
(see [33]) of solving (2) and (3). The following are definitions of
parameters appearing in this table:
s = b x + b x
,
A = [z 2 (R-l)-R]/(z-l) 2
,
B = A(z-l) 2 /z 2 = [z 2 (R-l)-R]/z 2 .
The table has been developed by working backwards from each extremal end
state of battle. In Table I, if the initial force levels P = (x ,x„,y
n
)
are such that P belongs to the domain of controllability (see [33])
for the terminal state C (denoted as D(C )), then Y can steer the
course of battle to this end state with the (open-loop) extremal control
shown in the table. It turns out that several of the domains of control-
lability shown in Table I overlap so that for a given set of initial force
levels there may be more than one candidate optimal course of battle.
One can compare the returns from these alternatives (a finite number)
.
This is how the optimal (open-loop) fire distribution policy shown in
Table II has been obtained from the information of Table I. An outline of
the details of this determination is as follows [43]
.
Let D(C.) denote the domain of controllability for extremals
leading to C, and P. denote the return associated with an extremal
i l
leading to C.. For example, it may be shown that
P
l
= (b~R^ ^ + (R"1 )(b 2x 2 )Z " alV
A subtle theoretical result required to obtain these results is that sign
restrictions on certain terminal multipliers depend on whether or not
replacements are allowed (i.e. in a problem like (9) whether or not r > 0)
[42]. X
19
Table I. Extremals for Isbell-Marlow Problem for
R - /R(R-l) < 5 < 1.
Nonrestrictive Assumption: R > 1, i.e. a b > a b
Case (2): R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1 where 6 = a p/(a q)
Terminal State Extremal Control Domain of Controllability
j
1 for £ t <: t
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(c) t 1 is determined by cosh /a b \ = .1 z 2. 1 R - 1
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Table II. Solution to Isbell-Marlow Problem for
R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1.
Nonrestrictive Assumption: R > 1, i.e. a b > a b
Case (2): R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1 where 6 = a p/(a q)
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Definitions of Times: for t , t_, and t , see Table I.
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Then, by direct computation of the return functional (considerations "in










(P°) > P^P ) for all P°
€
(D^) HDCC^)},
(3) P^(P°) > P^P ) for all P° e (D(C
1
) OD^)}.
It should be noted that D(C ) f) D(C ) = *, D(C ) H D(C^) = $ , and
s
D(C ) f) D(C ) = $ , where $ denotes the empty set.
Also of interest is whether the nature of the scenario (i.e. planning
horizon) affects the structure of the optimal fire distribution policy.
Accordingly, we can consider a "prescribed duration" version of the problem
(2) in which the battle can last a maximum time of T (which is specified)





(T) =0 and T s; T±s
(b) y(T) =0 and T <; T
,
or (c) T = T±> (4)
where T denotes the time at which the battle ends. Again (see [24] or
Appendix G of [35]), 4>* turns out to be or 1 except for at most
one point in time, although the dependence of <J>* on t, x , x , and y
is even more complicated than for the terminal control battle (2), (3).
q^ a
2
upon which the solutionThere is also an additional parameter
may depend. The most significant result, though, is that the optimal
policy may not be the same as for the previous case (see Appendix G of
[35]). Hence, even the scenario may affect the optimal policy.
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Finally, it seems appropriate to discuss the extension of the above
model (2), (3) to more "realistic" breakpoints (the force level at which
a unit ceases to be effective). From historical sources, it is clear that
the stopping rule (3) is not in consonance with empirical evidence. One's
initial reaction to this state of affairs might be to retain the combat
attrition equations (2) but modify (3) to more commonly accepted breakpoint
levels. For example, it is frequently assumed that an attacking unit "breaks"
at seventy per cent of its initial strength. The author has come to the
conclusion [44] that if such a breakpoint is considered, the combat attrition
equations must also be modified . For illustrative purposes, let us consider
combat between two homogeneous forces, denoted as X and Y.
Assuming that fire is aimed and target acquisition is not a con-
straining factor, one might hypothesize the following familiar Lanchester-





g = "bx. (5)
If such a breakpoint hypothesis is combined with equations (5) , there is
a rather sharp discontinuity in unit effectiveness when a unit reaches
its breakpoint [44]. Considering work by Spring and Miller at RAND [29],






r X -X \V\
% - -Mi - bV- 1 *> <«dt X X
BP
*
See [12] for a criticism of breakpoint hypotheses.
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where x denotes the force level at which the X unit becomes ineffective
Br
(i.e. its breakpoint). If heterogeneous-force versions of (6) are used in
place of (2) , then the resulting optimal control problem is not amenable
at all to analytic solution. The model's mathematical tractability has
been sacrificed to "realism." However, many aspects of the development
of the solution to the original problem (2) , (3) are still applicable and
provide insights for guiding the computational solution to the more com-
plicated version.
7. "Linear-Law" Attrition of Target Types .
It is convenient to refer to an attrition process in which the
attrition rate of a target type is proportional only to the number of
firers as a "square-law" attrition process. Similarly, it is convenient
to refer to an attrition process in which the attrition rate of a target
type is proportional to the product of the numbers of firers and targets
as a "linear-law" attrition process. As pointed out in [36], a "square-
law" attrition process is characterized by constant returns over time per
unit of weapon system allocated, whereas a "linear-law" attrition process
is characterized by diminishing returns. These different properties lead
to an essential difference in the structures of the optimal fire distribu-
tion policies.
Let us therefore, consider a version of (2) in which each of the
X-force target types undergoes a "linear-law" attrition process in a
prescribed duration battle.
*
The circumstances under which these attrition processes have been hypothesized
to arise are reviewed in [40]
.
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maximize {ry(T) - px (T) - qx
2












dt= "Vl " b 2X2' (7)
<:<}>£ 1 , x , x , y k , and T £ T .
The solution to (7) was developed in [38] and contrasted to that of (2),
(3) and other models in [36].
There is a fundamental difference between the structure of the
optimal fire distribution policy for (2), (3) and that for (7): when target
types undergo a "linear-law" attrition process, the optimal distribution
of fire does not have to be an extreme point in the control variable space
at all times. In other words, <j>* may be other than or 1. The theory
of singular extremals (see [38]) is required to solve this problem with <J>*
such that < <j>* = a /(a +a„) < 1 being the "singular" control. Again,
the optimal policy depends directly upon force levels (and possibly time)
.
In [38] we showed that for constant attrition-rate coefficients no change
occurs in the ranking of target priorities when survivors are assigned a
linear utility in direct proportion to their kill rate against Y, and
this is independent of whether target types undergo a "square-law" or a
"linear-law" attrition process.
b
1The solution to (7) for -*- = — is shown in Figure 2. When
q b
2
a b x > a b x
,
the optimal policy is to concentrate all fire on X .























































divides the state space into decision regions. When a force level trajectory
reaches L, fire is split over the target types such that the trajectory
b
±
stays on L. For *. > — the solution is shown in Figure 3. The battle
q b
2
is divided into two time phases: Phase I for £ t £ t and Phase II
for t < t £ T. During Phase I the optimal target engagement policy at
a point in time is determined by the location of the point on the battle
trajectory with respect to the line L, which is the singular "surface."
During Phase II the optimal target engagement policy is to use <}>* = 1
below L' (with equation a px = a qx ) and <j>* = above L 1 .
8 . Further Extensions .
Further extensions of the above basic problems that have been
studied by the author are as follows:
(1) replacements [37],
(2) n-versus-one combat [36] (see also Appendix E in [35]),
(3) variable attrition-rate coefficients [37]
,
(4) other combat attrition forms (see Appendix K in [35]),
(5) combat attrition modeled as a stochastic process [24],
(6) command and control aspects [45],
(7) logistics aspects [3] .
Our research findings on many of the above are summarized on pp. 59-64
of [35]. It should be pointed out that our work on the two basic problems
(2) and (7) has been essential in guiding these extensions. We will now
give formulations for some of the above and occasionally make some remarks.
In [37] we considered the following problem with time-dependent
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subject to: -j—- =
-<J>a
1

















+ s(t), " (8)
s£
<J>
£ 1, x ,x ,y ;> 0, and T £ T .
In this paper we gave the first application of the theory of SVIC's to
allocation problems in the Lanchester theory of combat. A rather remark-
able theoretical result that is required for the solution of such a problem
is the following: the multiplier corresponding, for example, to the
terminal inequality constraint x (T) ^ is restricted in sign only if
r.. (T) > [42]. Some of our results in [37] are based on our work on
analytic solutions to variable coefficient Lanchester-type equations [32],
[40].
We have also generalized these results to n-versus-one combat [37]
(see also Appendix E of [35]).
n











I <J» £ 1, <j> £ 0, x y ;> 0, and T <: T .
i-1
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A rather illuminating result is that is w. = kb. for i = l,...,n,
then the optimal fire distribution policy for Y (at least when y(T) > 0)




More recently we have examined the effects of command and control
limitations (in the sense that there is a limitation on how fast fire can
be redistributed) on such fire distribution policies [45].




subject to: -z— = -<j>a y,
dx
' =
-(l-4.)a y,dt v r/ r
d£ =^ - b 2x2 ,
& - -. ™
£ <j> £ 1, x ,x ,y ^ 0, -IL <: u ^ Ry , and T :£ T
1
.
It turns out [45] that such command and control limitations do not essen-
tially alter the optimal fire distribution decision rules, although the
shifting of fires is initiated earlier when command and control limitations
exist than when an entire force can instantaneously shift their fires from
one target type to another.
Finally, we have considered the optimal control of Lanchester-type
stochastic processes. For example, we have studied the following problem
[24].
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maximize E[rN(t ) - pM (t ) - qM (t )] with t specified,
Subject to: casualties occur randomly as a continuous
parameter Markov chain with stationary
transition probabilities corresponding to
deterministic "square-law" attrition
process (2) , (11)
M ,M ,N ;> and £ <|> £ 1,
where the random variables M (t)
,
M (t) , and N(t) are force levels
(integers) and E[*] denotes mathematical expectation. It is shown in
[24] that the structure of the optimal fire distribution policy remains
essentially the same when casualties occur randomly, although the optimal
policy followed by Y in a realization of the stochastic combat process
may differ appreciably from that for the deterministic formulation if
the realization does not "follow" the deterministic trajectory.
Further discussion of the above problems and further results are
to be found in [35].
9 . Model Which can be Extended to Justify General Patton's Tactics in
Europe in World War II .
In this section we will describe a simple model which, nevertheless,
can generate some insights into tactics used by General George S. Patton,
Jr., in World War II. Consider combat between X and Y forces. Part
of the X forces (denoted as X_) can be kept in reserve and consequently
do not consume supplies as rapidly as the combatant forces (denoted as X )
do. Due to "pipeline" capacity there is an upper limit to the rate at
which supplies can be replenished. The decision variable under the control
of the X commander is the rate of reinforcing (or withdrawing for u(t)
negative) the X forces. This situation is shown in Figure 4.
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u
Figure 4. Diagram of Supply-Constrained Combat Problem.
In mathematical terms, the problem is as follows.



















-W ^ u £ R and x.. ,x~,y,S ^ 0,
with the stopping rule
(a) X;L (T) = 0,
(b) y(T) = 0,
or (c) S < 0,
where P denotes the "pipeline" capacity and S denotes the supply
level of the X forces. Currently, one of my Ph.D. students in Operations
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Research at USNPGS (LCDR Robert L. Powers, USN) is studying this problem
(see [3] for a discussion of its formulation). If supplies are to become
a constraining factor for the X forces later in combat, then the optimal
tactic is to "overcommit" forces early in the campaign (i.e. forces are
being withdrawn at the moment when the supply constraint becomes active)
.
Of particular mathematical difficulty is the presence of a second order
SVIC in this problem (see [42]).
10. Optimization of Combat Dynamics : Conclusions .
Some conclusions that we have reached from our study of the
optimization of combat dynamics are as follows:
(1) The nature of the attrition process has a significant effect
upon optimal strategies.
(2) Force levels do affect optimal strategies. Whether one is
going to "win" (superiority) or "lose" (inferiority) affects
what one's optimal strategy will be.
(3) Even the nature of the scenario (e.g. terminal control or
prescribed duration conflict) may affect optimal strategies.
(4) Optimal tactics are also significantly influenced by the nature
of the target acquisition process and command and control
capabilities
.
A further discussion is to be found in [35]
.
It finally should be remarked that in all our studies above we
have noticed that optimal tactics are intimately related to the end to
which the combat can be steered. Thus, one must first find out where he
can go before he worries about optimizing. The author feels that future
research should center upon looking for planning horizon theorems (which
divide a conflict into "phases") . The type of question that is to be asked
is: under what circumstances are optimal tactics in one phase independent
of other combat phases?
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